By David Holloway
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Extra resources for 9 11 and the War on Terror (Representing American Events) (2008)
The 9/11 Commission Report commented on a lack of cohesion between security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the US – a situation not necessarily remedied by legislation such as the Homeland Security Act (2002), or by the US Department of Homeland Security (2003) the Act created. ) More than a lack of cohesion, the extent to which different parts of the state bureaucracy were at times actively at odds with each other after 9/11 was one indicator of the degree to which the White House and Pentagon drove an agenda that was often depicted at the time as radical, authoritarian and illegal in both federal and international law.
Invasion of Iraq, particularly after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal came to light in spring 2004. 2) – debates that reached a turning point in November 2006, when dramatic midterm election results meant the Republican Party lost control of both Houses of Congress to the Democrats for the ﬁrst time since 1994. The 2006 midterms looked like a damning rebuke for the White House, whose political credibility was weakened further in December with the publication of the ﬁndings of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bi-partisan committee established by Congress in March 2006 to investigate the state of the war in Iraq and to advise on policy options and ways ahead.
Yet it wasn’t just a lack of communication 40 POLITICS that alarmed the 9/11 Commissioners. Over and again in The 9/11 Commission Report the agencies and institutions themselves sounded chronically unﬁt for purpose. The CIA, the Report concluded, had neither the structure nor the operational capability to lead the intelligence war against al-Qaeda. : 13). : 7). The Report also concluded that the Defense Department was hamstrung in its approach to al-Qaeda before 9/11 by the same operational handicaps that contemporary empire revisionists said were symptoms of a reluctant ‘empire lite’ – risk-aversion and a dependence on unreliable proxies to do the dangerous and dirty work of ﬁghting on the ground.